股權激勵是一把雙刃劍，用得好，雙方得利；用不好，傷人傷己。那么，怎樣才能用好這把雙刃劍呢?下面跟小編一起來看下實施股權激勵的主要風險有哪些？

Equity incentive is a double-edged sword, which can be used well and benefit both sides; If you don't use it well, you will hurt others and yourself. So, how can we make good use of this double-edged sword? What are the main risks of implementing equity incentive with Xiaobian?

1、激勵股份額度是“拍腦袋”定的，忌諱激勵不足；

1. The quota of incentive shares is set by "beating your head", and insufficient incentive is taboo;

激勵股份額是要結合企業實際進行科學測算的，不能“拍腦袋”。否則容易出現激勵過度或激勵不足的現象，一旦出現激勵不足的現象，那對激勵對象是沒什么激勵效果的。

The amount of incentive shares should be scientifically calculated in combination with the actual situation of the enterprise, and can not "pat the head". Otherwise, it is easy to have the phenomenon of excessive or insufficient incentive. Once there is insufficient incentive, it has no incentive effect on the incentive object.

2、激勵股份分配不合理，容易產生利益矛盾；

2. The distribution of incentive shares is unreasonable, which is easy to produce interest contradictions;

激勵股份分配是要構建計算公式的模型后通過計算來分配的，這樣才能做到公開、公平、公正。若激勵股份分配是由老 板指定的，則容易出現分配不公的現象，這不利于化 解和平衡利益矛盾，也很難構建有序的人才機制，從而達到股權激勵的目的。

The distribution of incentive shares should be distributed through calculation after constructing the model of calculation formula, so as to be open, fair and just. If the distribution of incentive shares is designated by the boss, it is prone to unfair distribution, which is not conducive to resolving and balancing interest contradictions, and it is difficult to build an orderly talent mechanism, so as to achieve the purpose of equity incentive.

3、激勵對象沒有奮斗目標，股份收益與公司目標無關；

3. The incentive object has no goal, and the share income has nothing to do with the company's goal;

公司沒有年度經營計劃和發展目標，激勵對象就失去了奮斗目標。那么，在沒有奮斗目標的前提下，激勵對象股份的收益完全取決于公司業績好壞的慣性。這樣下去，一旦公司業績沒達到預期，激勵效果肯定是不好的。

If the company has no annual business plan and development goals, the incentive objects will lose their goals. Then, on the premise of no goal, the income of the incentive object shares completely depends on the inertia of the company's performance. In this way, once the company's performance does not meet expectations, the incentive effect will certainly be bad.

4、激勵股份固化到人頭，考核管理對其股份收益沒影響；

4. Incentive shares are fixed to the head, and assessment management has no impact on their share income;

激勵股份一旦辦理了有關工 商變更法律手續，就固化到了人頭，這時，公司奮斗目標與業績考核結果的好壞與激勵對象的股份收益沒有直接管理關系，否則就是違法的。所以，一旦激勵股份固化了，激勵對象就沒什么壓力了，干好干壞一個樣，因不能影響其股份收益了，甚至使有的激勵對象就直接躺在股份上睡覺了。

Once the incentive shares have gone through the relevant legal procedures for industrial and commercial change, they will be solidified to the head. At this time, the quality of the company's objectives and performance assessment results has no direct management relationship with the incentive object's share income, otherwise it is illegal. Therefore, once the incentive shares are solidified, the incentive objects will have no pressure. They will do well and do badly, because they can't affect their share income, and even some incentive objects will sleep directly on the shares.

5、沒有完善的退出機制，屆時會為此扯皮；

5. If there is no perfect exit mechanism, there will be wrangling at that time;

若沒有明確的退出條件、價 格等規定，那么在退出時就會出現“公說公有理、婆說婆有理”現象，就會扯皮，沒法有用執行這套股權激勵制度，這樣也是很難達到應有的激勵效果的。

If there are no clear exit conditions, prices and other provisions, there will be a phenomenon of "public saying that public is reasonable and women saying that women are reasonable" when exiting, which will lead to wrangling and can not effectively implement this set of equity incentive system, which is also difficult to achieve the due incentive effect.